The first and most important outcome of the Ukrainian conflict is a geopolitical remodeling of the international system and a discontinuity in global relations between the two subsystems, European and Atlantic on the one hand, European and Asian on the other. Europe loses its historic role as a power of balance between America and Russia and a great vacuum of powers establishes in the western part of the continent, not compensated by the scale of German rearmament (100 billion euros) . The instability of the European subsystem is aggravated by the absence of a strategic perspective, by the particularism of its diplomatic behavior and by the difficult search for a common leadership. This instability comes from afar. For the historical aspect it comes from 1945 and the establishment of American tutelage, for the political aspect, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and for the moral aspect, from the end of intellectual ambitions to want to count in the world, adding to it the exhaustion of the dream of continental unity. The Ukrainian conflict demonstrates the European Union’s inability to promote peace between East and West and to ensure an “equal and indivisible” European security architecture. Moreover, it acts as a model of rupture in international cooperation relations within a triadic system (United States, Russia and China) and prefigures in Asia-Pacific a relationship of strategic interdependence and military confrontation, because of the possible opening, by China, of an identity crisis concerning the “status quo” of Taiwan. In this hypothesis, which would open the doors of planetary geopolitics towards the Pacific and Australia, would immediately change the outcome of the conflict between Moscow and the West, as well as the calculations of the West on the role of Russia, in Europe, Central Asia and Asia Pacific. In a perspective of a global confrontation between the major powers of the planet, Europe, NATO, the European Union, Germany and the countries of Central Europe and neighboring countries, including Ukraine, deprived of ” general will” and therefore of a political and spiritual leader, would be of less importance. On the other hand, Russia, threatened vis-à-vis China by its double vulnerability in Eastern Siberia, territorial and demographic, could dissociate itself from an overly tight anti-hegemonic alliance (Russia-China-Iran), marking the opposition planetary between the Hearthland and the Rimland.
The Ukrainian conflict would change in nature and in stake, and the instability of the European subsystem would spread to Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia, aggravated by the political autonomy of the Greater -Brittany, engaged in the Pacific, within the Aukus (anti-Chinese military alliance between the USA, Australia, Great Britain of September 15, 2021). Thus, and from the historical point of view, the global remodeling of the international system, as a possible outcome of the Ukrainian conflict, poses the problem of the political and civilizational hegemony of the West as the capital node of our time. Any strategic calculation on the international system of tomorrow now inscribes the problem of hegemony and the decisive unity of any world order, at the heart of the question of power in our historical conjuncture.